Showing posts with label Insurance and Pension. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Insurance and Pension. Show all posts

Sunday, October 17, 2010

Dana Pensiun di Indonesia (Pension Funds in Indonesia)


Dana Pensiun di Indonesia dapat dipisahkan menjadi 2 kategori:
1. DPPK (Dana Pensiun Pemberi Kerja)-EPF (Dana Pensiun Pemberi Kerja)
2. DPLK (Dana Pensiun Lembaga Keuangan)-DPLK (Dana Pensiun Lembaga Keuangan)
Jenis program pensiun:
1. Program Iuran Pasti
2. Program Pensiun Manfaat Pasti




Dana pensiun
Dana Pensiun Pemberi Kerja (EPF) - DPPK
- EPF adalah entitas yang terpisah dari perusahaan.
- Untuk mengatur EPF, perusahaan harus mengajukan permohonan lisensi resmi dari Departemen Keuangan.
- Jenis Rencana: Iuran Pasti atau Manfaat Pasti
- Iuran Pasti (DC) Rencana:
Keuntungannya adalah akumulasi dari kontribusi ditambah bunga pada usia pensiun
- Manfaat Pasti (DB) Rencana:
Manfaatnya ditentukan dalam jumlah tetap pada pencapaian usia pensiun. Rumusnya adalah sebagai berikut:
Faktor x Tahun Layanan x Final Pensiun Gaji mampu
- Pensiunan telah mentransfer manfaat lump sum ke manfaat penghasilan bulanan dengan membeli program anuitas dari Perusahaan Asuransi Jiwa

Dana Pensiun Lembaga Keuangan (DPLK) - DPLK
DPLK adalah entitas yang terpisah dari Perusahaan Asuransi Jiwa atau Bank.
- Untuk mengatur DPLK, Perusahaan Asuransi Jiwa atau Bank telah mengajukan permohonan lisensi resmi dari Departemen Keuangan.
- Jenis Rencana: Iuran Pasti
Program Iuran Pasti:
Keuntungannya adalah akumulasi dari kontribusi ditambah bunga pada usia pensiun.
- Pensiunan telah mentransfer manfaat lump sum ke manfaat penghasilan bulanan dengan membeli program anuitas dari Perusahaan Asuransi Jiwa.

Monday, June 14, 2010

Pension Funds in Indonesia

Pension Funds in Indonesia can be separated into 2 categories:
1. DPPK (Dana Pension Pemberi Kerja) –EPF (Employer Pension Fund)
2. DPLK (Dana Pension Lembaga Keuangan) –FIPF (Financial Institution Pension Fund)



Type of pension plans:
1. Defined Contribution Plan

2. Defined Benefit Plan

Pension Fund
Employer Pension Fund (EPF) – DPPK
- EPF is a separate entity of the company.
- To set up an EPF, the company has to apply for legal license from the Ministry of Finance.
- Type of Plan: Defined Contribution or Defined Benefit
- Defined Contribution (DC) Plan:
The benefit is the accumulation of the contribution plus interest at retirement age
- Defined Benefit (DB) Plan:
The benefit is determined in a fixed amount at the attainment of retirement age. The formula is as follows:
Factor x Year of Service x Final Pension able Salary
- The retiree has to transfer the lump sum benefit to a monthly income benefit by purchasing an annuity plan from a Life Insurance Company

Financial Institution Pension Fund (FIPF) – DPLK
FIPF is a separate entity of the Life Insurance Company or Bank.
- To set up a FIPF, the Life Insurance Company or Bank has to apply for legal license from the Ministry of Finance.
- Type of Plan: Defined Contribution
Defined Contribution Plan:
The benefit is the accumulation of the contribution plus interest at retirement age.
- The retiree has to transfer the lump sum benefit to a monthly income benefit by purchasing an annuity plan from a Life Insurance Company.

Saturday, June 5, 2010

Source of Profit Insurance

In the pricing insurance, sources of profit depend on:

1.        Interest
          Profit will happened if interest earned less than interest credited
2.       Cost of Insurance
          Cost of insurance charges less than death benefit paid
3.       Expense Charges
          Expense charges less than expenses and commissions
4.       Surrender Charges

From Single Star to Team Player

A single star is someone who performs really well in his or her job but does not help others. Or one asks for help and is sometimes even abrasive when asked to do something for the company that does not benefit him or her directly. The problem with these people is that they can poison the organization—they set a bad example for others if executives keep rewarding and





promoting them. Managers may feel that they need them, of course, as they do perform well. So it is pretty gutsy to fire them in today's rather poor economic environment. But if you're really serious about building a collaborative company and want to reap the economic rewards from doing so, you have to screen for single stars

Companies, industries, and functions that reward hugely based on individual performance are prone to this problem. It is a problem in investment banking and can also be a problem in sales organizations where individuals are compensated for their own sales and not for helping others and sharing best practices.

Many companies have focused on knowledge management the last couple of years. While that has been a good start, it is only one part of the overall challenge of creating an effective collaborative organization. KM is only a special case of instilling a collaborative organization, which also includes coordinating activities and doing joint work across organization boundaries.

Why Employees Don't Collaborate
Executives first need to understand why people in the organization are not collaborating and sharing as much as they should.
There are four obstacles involving employees' motivations and abilities that must be overcome.

First, unwillingness to seek advice and learn from others. Employees may not want to seek advice across the organization, either because they believe they cannot learn anything or because there is a prevailing norm that people ought to fix their problems themselves. No electronic knowledge management system can fix this problem; simply making documents and links to experts available does not help if employees do not want input from others.

Another method is to recruit employees who have a natural inclination to ask for help. A chain of restaurants in the U.S. does this deliberately. At interview, it asks: "What obstacles have you faced in a previous job that prevented you from doing a good job and how did you overcome these obstacles?" The desirable answer should include asking for help and communicating the problem to others, not trying to be a hero and fix it alone.

Second, there is inability to find expertise. There is often someone who knows the answer to a problem but it may be nearly impossible to connect the person who has the expertise with the one who needs it. Clearly, databases and electronic search engines serve a useful role here but more in the capacity of being "electronic yellow pages" than as self sufficient electronic repositories. In most management consulting companies, for example, consultants upload sanitized documents containing their finished work into databases, which are then accessed by other consultants who review prior work and contact the consultants who did it.

However, technology has its limits. Expert directories become out of date and do not fully capture what each person knows. More importantly, they do not allow for creative combinations of ideas and individuals. Companies therefore need to cultivate people who know where experts and ideas reside. These "connectors" tend to be long-timers who have worked in many different areas in the company and hence have an extensive personal network. They see opportunities for new value creation based on the combination of talent, ideas, and expertise in different units.

Then there is unwillingness to help. Is knowledge hoarded in your company? Employees may be willing to seek advice but others are sometimes reluctant to share it. The growing emphasis on performance management has fuelled this problem: People no longer have the time to help others, or they do not care, because they are only asked to deliver on their own targets. While performance is important, executives also need to develop incentives to help others and cultivate a shared identity among employees. This is a notorious problem in many investment banks, where bankers chase their own opportunities without properly assisting others.

Lastly, there is the inability to work together. A "chemistry" problem can sometimes prevent people working well together, even if they want to and are part of a project team. It is a very different problem from the other three obstacles and requires different responses, including training sessions on teamwork, coaching people as they try to work together, and the development of strong relations between people from different units.

For example, a study of time-to-market performance of new product development projects in a high-technology company found that project engineers who worked with engineers from other divisions took 20 to 30 percent longer to complete their projects when they had not established a personal relationship. Engineers found it hard to articulate, understand, and absorb complex technologies that were transferred between divisions when they had not learned to work together beforehand.

Managers must respond to each of these obstacles in different ways. For example, developing an electronic knowledge management system will not help if the underlying problem is that employees hoard knowledge and will not seek help; it will only make people cynical about collaboration. Likewise, making promotion contingent on the extent to which people seek advice from others will not help if there is no way of identifying experts. All four obstacles need to be overcome for effective collaboration to occur. Solving one problem, but not the others, will not help.

by Morten Hansen

FERTILITY RATES

Fertility rates vary not only from country to country and from time to time; they can be affected by economic and social factors as well.

TRENDS IN FERTILITY are rated as the most difficult of the demographic variables to project (others being immigration, emigration, mortality, labor force participation, and ages at certain vital events such as marriage). And while fertility rates are extremely difficult







  • to project and predict, they usually represent the most important modeling variable in any population model. These models, in turn, are of critical importance to many users, including social security actuaries who must use these data to project future benefit/contribution cost ratios.

    A fertility rate is a measure of the average number of children a woman will have during her lifetime (obviously limited to her childbearing years). In most countries, three general demographic trends have been observed: reductions in infant mortality, increased life expectancy, and decreasing fertility rates.

    Some of Economic Theories of Fertility Rate Trends

    Richard Easterlin (1987). Easterlin postulated that fertility rates do, and would continue to, rise and fall with a cycle of two generations or about 40 to 50 years (peak to peak or trough to trough). He explains that members of small birth cohorts (when fertility rates are low) will have an easier time entering the job market, achieving good wages, and getting promotions. In contrast, those in large birth cohorts (when fertility rates are high) will have problems that can be seen as the mirror image (difficulty in entering the labor force, lower wages, and slower promotions).

    Those members of the smaller birth cohorts who achieve a higher standard of living sooner will marry sooner, will have their first child sooner, and will ultimately have more children in total. Twenty years later, this new larger set of birth cohorts will find it harder to achieve the same standard of living and will marry later, have their first child at an older age, and ultimately have fewer children.

    Diane Macunovich (1996). Easterlin’s theories assume that females play essentially a passive role in the fertility patterns. Macunovich, on the other hand, adds a factor to the basic Easterlin model that accounts for the female wage impact on fertility. Over the past 50 years, women have obtained higher levels of education, entered the labor force in increasing numbers, and achieved independent monetary resources. Macunovich believes that while an increase in a male’s relative income (versus his material expectation) will cause a resultant rise in fertility rates, an increase in a female’s relative income will produce downward pressure on fertility. These contradictory indications, therefore, need to exist in
    any successful theory of fertility rate movement.

    Butz and Ward (1977). The theories of William Butz and Michael Ward include three critical factors: the proportion of women in the labor force, women’s earnings, and men’s earnings. As analyzed previously, fertility rates are positively correlated to men’s earnings but are negatively correlated to women’s earnings. During recessions, when family income is lower, couples will have fewer children because of the high direct costs associated with childbearing. However, economic prosperity may not automatically bring higher fertility rates if women’s labor force participation rates rise.

    The Butz and Ward model states that times of economic prosperity are the most expensive times for employed women to have children. For women in the labor force, there will be a delay in childbirth and fertility rates can actually decrease. In summary, Butz and Ward explain that fertility rates are positively related to family income and negatively associated with women’s employment and wages. The correlation between women’s wages and fertility is stronger the larger the proportion of women employed.

    John Ermisch (1983). Ermisch’s theory distinguishes between women who work and those who do not. Ermisch explains that as more females choose to work most of their lives, the average age at first birth increases and the intervals between births decrease. In particular, women employed in professional positions tend to wait longer between marriage and the birth of their first child.
    In single-earner households (with only a male wage earner), if the male wage rises rapidly and the cost of children remains constant, that family will have more children.

    For two-wage-earner families, however, where the wife has to leave the work force or interrupt a career path to have children, the opportunity cost of having children is high. A child would demand more of the couple’s time and lower the family’s income due to the loss of the wife’s earnings.

    When the number of females in the labor force increases, fertility tends to decrease even during times of economic growth. Ermisch also found that the increased probability of divorce may keep the fertility rate down.

    Social Causes
    Education: A woman’s education is a critical element in explaining resultant fertility rates and movements. Higher female education is universally associated with lower and delayed fertility. Higher female education, however, is also positively correlated with the probability of the child’s survival. In a somewhat similar fashion, one finds higher fertility in rural areas (especially where this makes ducation more difficult) than in urban areas. This may also reflect differential access to family planning information.

    Evidence shows that fertility declines as a country’s population becomes more urban and as women become more highly educated. In Jordan, for example, women with no formal education had a fertility rate of 6.9, while those with secondary school or higher education had a fertility rate of 4.1.

    Religion: In places where religion has an influence on fertility, that influence can be strong. For example, Italy and Spain are both countries with a high percentage “Catholic” population. Historically, this would have led to an expectation of elevated fertility. However, Spain and Italy have the two lowest fertility rates in the world. Thus, one must conclude that religion is not as influential in these countries as was the case historically. As another example, the United States is now a more “religious” country than Canada. About 34 percent of U.S. women of childbearing age practice their religion on a weekly basis, which is almost double the 18 percent proportion in Canada.

    Greater religious observance tends to go along with higher marriagerates and lower divorce rates. This tends to result in high- er fertility rates because people expect to stay in a more stable relationship and are, therefore, more likely to have children.

    Conclusion
    Obviously, myriad factors can and do affect fertility rates. Some are economic in nature, others are more social. Clearly, however, couples have more control now over how many children they want to have and when they want to have them. Many families are choosing to start their families later.

    This may be due to economic difficulties or the growing fragility of conjugal relationships. Having postponed the birth of a first child, however, delays all childbearing, which often results in a smaller number of children than desired. This, in turn, is a partial explanation of generally falling rates of fertility in industrialized countries, with the United States being a
    notable outlier.

    Robert l. Brown is director of the institute of
    Insurance and pension research in the
    Department of statistics and actuarial science
    At the university of waterloo in waterloo,
    Ontario, canada. He also wishes to
    Acknowledge the assistance of claire norville
    And rocio gomez in the preparation of this
    Article.